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Resum 
El 20 de febrer de 2006 es va aprovar el Reglament núm. 318/2006 del Consell que reforma 
l'Organització Comuna de Mercats del sucre. L'article analitza els canvis introduïts en el nou 
règim europeu del sucre i valora la seva adequació a les normes i demandes internacionals de 
liberalització del comerç agrícola. Es conclou que la reforma ha estat el mínim necessari per 
fer front als reptes internacionals: la recent resolució de l'Òrgan de Solució de Diferències de 
l'Organització Mundial del Comerç i les demandes de liberalització plantejades en el marc de 
la Ronda de Doha. 
 
JEL: F13, K33, Q17, Q18 
 
Resumen 
El 20 de febrero de 2006 se aprobó el Reglamento nº 318/2006 del Consejo que reforma la 
Organización Común de Mercados del azúcar. El artículo analiza los cambios introducidos en 
el nuevo régimen europeo del azúcar y valora su adecuación a las normas y demandas 
internacionales de liberalización del comercio agrícola. Se concluye que la reforma ha sido el 
mínimo necesario para hacer frente a los retos internacionales: la reciente resolución del 
Órgano de Solución de Diferencias de la Organización Mundial del Comercio y las demandas 
de liberalización planteadas en el marco de la Ronda de Doha. 
 
Abstract 
The WTO rules have had a direct influence upon the 2006 reform of the European Common 
Market Sugar Organisation. The pre-2006 sugar CMO was not in a position to successfully 
face neither the recent Resolution of the World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement 
Body and the liberalisation demands made in the Doha Round context. Through a 
comparative analysis of the European sugar regime, before and after the reform, this paper 
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argues that the 2006 changes are the minimum improvements necessary to face present 
international challenges. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On 20 February 2006, the Council of Agriculture Ministers of the 
European Union (EU) passed the first large-scale reform of the Common 
Market Organisation (CMO) for sugar. With this reform, the new CMO for 
sugar is governed by EU Council Regulation No 318/20062 for the duration of 
the period 2006/07-2009/10. The new European sugar regime must face up to 
both current and potential international demands for liberalisation in the 
agricultural sector. 
 
This paper examines the international dimensions of the reform of the 
CMO for sugar. It analyses the content of the new sugar regime and compares it 
with the previous system. It then assesses the extent to which the reform meets 
international calls for liberalisation. To do so, the paper is organised in five 
sections, with the second section setting out the current world demands for 
liberalisation. The third section tackles all the instruments used for intervention 
and protection of the EU sugar market in the trade years prior to the reform. The 
fourth section then examines the way that the reform alters the instruments, and 
the final section engages in a critical analysis of the extent to which the sugar 
regime—both before and after the reform—offers an adequate response to the 
current and any future environment of liberalisation. 
 
II. International calls for liberalisation 
 
Previously, the CMO for sugar had to adapt to the Agriculture Agreement 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). In order to comply with the provisions of Council Regulation 
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(EC) No 1101/953, Council Regulation (EC) No 2038/19994 turned variable 
levies into fixed tariffs and spelt out the conditions for internal market access 
and export subsidies. The resulting CMO, however, was left out of the reforms 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), even the reforms of 2003 and 2004 
undertaken with an eye on the trade negotiations of the Doha Round. 
 
Currently, the CMO for sugar must meet new commitments within the 
framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These commitments 
include the ruling against the EU’s system of sugar export subsidies, on the part 
of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, as well as the multilateral negotiations 
in progress in the Doha Round. 
 
On 15 October 2004, a WTO special panel condemned5 EU sugar export 
subsidies for failing to comply with Articles 3.36 and 87 of the GATT’s 
Agriculture Agreement, and the condemnation was confirmed by the WTO’s 
Appellate Body8 on 28 April 2005. That is, the panel confirmed that the EU had 
been exceeding the monetary limit on sugar export subsidies as well as the 
maximum yearly quantity of allowable subsidised sugar since 1995. The 
Dispute Settlement Body accepted the reports of the panel and the Appellate 
Body on 19 May 2005. From that point, the case went to binding arbitrage in 
the WTO and the outcome stipulated that the reasonable deadline would be 22 
May 20069 for the EU to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s trade 
measure, placing a limit on the EU’s ability to export subsidised sugar and 
imposing a ban on the export of unsubsidised sugar. 
 
In addition, the new CMO for sugar must face up to the agricultural 
sector’s advances in liberalisation, made in the context of current multilateral 
negotiations. The negotiations have proven quite difficult in light of the distinct 
positions defended by the EU, the United States and the group of developing 
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countries (G-20). Nevertheless, agreement was reached on the new work 
programme of the Doha Round on 1 August 2004, establishing a framework for 
agricultural negotiations, and there have been concrete proposals on the table 
since October 2006.  Table 1 offers a high-level summary of the demands on the 
table, which take forward the liberalisation agreed in the Uruguay Round of 
GATT on each and every one of the three pillars of the Agriculture Agreement: 
domestic support, market access and export subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Demands on the Agricultural Sector Made in 
the Doha Round 
 
Domestic Support  The amber box is to be reduced by 
between 70% and 80%. 
The blue box is to be limited to a 
maximum of between 2.5 and 5% of 
total production value. 
 
Tariffs Average reduction of between 50% 
and 75%. The highest reductions are 
to be applied to products with the 
highest tariffs. 
Sensitive products are not to exceed 
between 1% and 8% of the tariff 
lines. 
 
Export Subsidies To be eliminated by 2013, but the 
greatest percentage of reduction 
must occur  in 2010.  
 
Source: MILLET, M. and P. GARCIA-DURAN, «La PAC face aux défis 
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du cycle de Doha», Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne, 
No 494, 2006, pp. 16-23. 
 
 
 
In terms of domestic support, a substantial reduction is required in aid 
that most negatively affects international trade: amber-box aid and blue-box aid. 
The Agriculture Agreement of the Uruguay Round categorises three kinds of 
support in these so-called “boxes”. Allowable aid falls in the “green box” and 
includes public spending on general services, natural disasters, regional and 
environmental development programmes, research and development, and 
income support to producers that is not linked to production decisions. Support 
to be banned falls in the “amber box” and includes price and agricultural 
production supports. Amber-box supports are set by the Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS)10. In addition, thanks to the Blair House Accord reached 
between the United States and the EU in December 1992, direct payments to 
producers based on historical yields were included in what is known as the blue 
box11, but were safeguarded by an acreage and livestock reduction programme. 
 
As for market access, sizeable tariff reductions are also demanded. To 
ensure that the reductions are substantial at all tariff levels, the highest tariffs 
are to be lowered by the greatest proportion and “temporary” tariff increases 
will be not permitted through use of the special safeguard provisions12. All the 
members of the CMO will, however, be able to designate a number of tariff 
lines as sensitive products, which will be subject to a lower reduction in tariffs.  
 
Export subsidies, according to the agreement reached at the Sixth 
Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, are to be completely 
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eliminated. They are to be phased out between 2010 and 2013, with the proviso 
that the highest percentage of reduction must occur in 2010. 
 
III. The CMO for sugar prior to the new reform 
 
The first regulatory scheme came with Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1009/6713, which had effect throughout the trade years 1968/69 to 1974/75. 
Then Council Regulation (EEC) No 3330/7414 came into force for the period 
1975/76–1980/81. Council Regulation (EC) No 1785/8115 covered the years 
from 1981/82 to 2000/01 and was supplemented by Council Regulation No 
2038/199916 for 1999/2000 and 2000/01. Lastly, Council Regulation (EC) No 
1260/200117 came into force from 2001/02 to 2005/06.  
 
As the fifth enlargement of the EU did not occur until 1 May 2004, this 
section of the paper takes the Council Regulation of 2001 as its legal reference, 
setting out the principal instruments of intervention and protection18 established 
in it for the previous CMO for sugar for the EU-15. Internal EU intervention 
took two main forms: a system of production quotas and a guaranteed price 
scheme. With regard to trade with non-EU countries, the main instruments of 
protection were also two in number: import restrictions (with the exception of 
preferred treatment given to certain trading nations) and export subsidies (for a 
given quantity of sugar). 
 
III.A- Quota System 
 
All EU-15 members are sugar-producing states, except for Luxembourg. 
They produce white, refined sugar (which has a standard saccharide content of 
99.5%) instead of raw, unrefined sugar (which has a lower standard saccharide 
content), because European sugar processors use vertical integration to lower 
 7 
the costs of transport, storage and reheating and to minimise potential waste. 
Additionally, all the white sugar obtained within the EU comes from sugar beet, 
with the exception of sugar cane produced in southern Spain and in a number of 
ultra-peripheral regions of the EU19. Broadly speaking, the products governed 
under the CMO for sugar include both the plant sources of sugar (sugar beet and 
sugar cane) and the products of the initial refining stage (sugar, isoglucose and 
inuline syrup). 
 
While the cited Council Regulation of 2001 was in operation, sugar 
production was controlled through A and B quotas. The regulation set quota 
shares for all EU members, who then distributed them among the producer 
companies located in their territory that enjoyed quotas during the trade year 
2000/0120. Thus, for each benefiting company, two types of sugar quota were 
available: A and B21. Any amount in excess of the sum total of quotas A and B 
for a company was categorised as C sugar22 and excluded from the quota 
system. In no case did the classification depend on the physical characteristics 
of the sugar. 
 
The difference between quotas for A and B sugar lay in the levies23 
applied to their respective production. In all other respects, the quotas benefited 
from the same price support and the same purchase guarantee, i.e. the right to 
have sugar bought by national intervention boards24. Similarly, they attracted 
the same export subsidies to encourage the sale of quota sugar on world 
markets. By contrast, C sugar received no guarantee of price or sale, either 
inside or outside the European market. In fact, it could not be sold in the EU 
market and had to be exported without subsidy and in a natural state by 1 
January of the following trade year25.  
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Table 2 sets out the quotas for A and B sugar for the EU-15 for the period 
from 2001/02 to 2005/06 as set by the Regulation of 2001. Quota A rose to 
11,894,223 mt (82% of the total) and was set based on the historical production 
levels of each country at the inception of the CMO for sugar. Quota B was 
2,587,919 mt (the remaining 18%) and it was established to benefit countries 
with comparative advantage in the production of beet sugar.  As a result, sugar-
exporting members, such as France and Germany, received a relatively higher 
proportion of B quota than A quota. Collectively, France and Germany received 
the highest quota amounts (50% of the total), followed by Italy and the United 
Kingdom (with 10% and 8%, respectively)26.  
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Table 2: Breakdown of Baseline Sugar Quantities for 
Member States Established in the Regulation for 2001/02 - 
2005/06 
(In metric tonnes of white sugar) 
 
Countries A Sugar B Sugar 
AUSTRIA 314,029 73,298 
BELGIUM(1) 674,906 144,906 
DENMARK 325,000 95,746 
FINLAND 132,806 13,280 
FRANCE(2) 2,970,359 798,632 
GERMANY 2,612,913 803,982 
GREECE 288,638 28,864 
IRELAND 181,145 18,115 
ITALY 1,310,904 246,539 
THE 
NETHERLANDS 684,112 180,447 
PORTUGAL(3) 72,428 7,243 
SPAIN 957,082 39,879 
SWEDEN 334,784 33,478 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 1,035,115 103,512 
TOTAL 11,894,223 2,587,919 
 
(1)
 Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. 
(2) Includes A and B sugar (463,872 mt and 46,373 mt, 
respectively) produced in the French overseas departments. 
(3)
 Includes A and B sugar (9,048 mt and 905 mt, respectively) 
produced in the Azores.  
 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 (Art. 11.2). 
 
 
Sugar quotas were lowered in the years 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2005/06 in 
the interests of complying with export subsidy reduction commitments adopted 
in the Uruguay Round of the GATT27. Council Regulation (EC) No 1101/95 
established that, when an exportable surplus28 in excess of the maximum 
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quantity attracting subsidy was envisaged by 1 October in a given trade year, 
the quotas for A and B sugar would be cut29.  
 
Accordingly, the guaranteed quotas for the trade years 2002/03 and 
2003/04 were reduced by 826,988 mt and 206,645 mt, respectively30. The 
cutbacks in sugar production for the year 2002/03 were announced after the 
sugar beet planting season, so they had no impact on production, except to 
increase the volume of C sugar. A large part of the increase in C sugar was 
carried over31 to the following year, with the result that there was a lower 
harvest that year. Despite that fact, the year 2003/04 saw another cut in the 
quotas. 
 
The overall reduction for the year 2005/06 was 1,805,961 mt32. The 
bumper sugar beet harvest of 2005 and the requirement to limit export subsidies 
from 23 May 2006, coming out of the panel and CMO Appellate Body rulings33, 
caused another reduction in guaranteed production levels in order to avoid 
excessive production surpluses. Based on the WTO settlement, C sugar exports 
were banned and the European Commission suspended the application process 
for C sugar export certificates, effective 23 May 200634.  
 
To make the quota system more flexible, two instruments were employed. 
Firstly, a mechanism to allow companies to transfer quotas allowed member 
states to transfer volumes within A and B quotas among companies located in 
their territory, taking into account the interests of the industry and especially 
sugar beet and sugar cane producers35. The transfers took place on the condition 
that each producer’s reduction in quotas A and B not exceed 10% of its original 
quota allocation. Once the volumes of A and B quotas to be transferred had 
been determined, the state reallocated them to one or various companies located 
in their territory, whether or not they had previously received quotas.  
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The second flexibility measure fell to the companies. They were given the 
opportunity to carry over given volumes of sugar to the following trade year, to 
be booked on account of future production. This specifically allowed each 
company to carry over all or part of the sugar which would have become C 
sugar to the subsequent year36. Carry-over sugar had to be stored for a period of 
one year37.  
 
III.B- Price Regime 
 
The quota system for A and B sugar was enforced to control EU 
production in the face of internal price guarantees pegged far in excess of the 
reigning international market price. In fact, from the mid-eighties to the trade 
year 2005/06, EU prices were two or three times higher than world prices38. 
Acting on instructions from the European Commission, the Council of 
Agriculture Ministers set four institutional prices for each trade year. In this 
sub-section, each of these guaranteed prices is briefly described. Since the trade 
year 1984/8539, all of them have remained frozen. 
 
The first step was to fix a target price and an intervention price for white 
sugar. The target price reflected the desired level of the sugar market price 
under normal conditions or, in other words, the optimal price that European 
sugar growers could receive, and it was set at 665 euros/mt. The intervention 
price functioned as a minimum market price and was applied to white sugar of a 
fair average quality, finished but unpackaged, loaded onto any transport of the 
buyer’s choice. It was the price at which the EC (using the resources of the 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF-G)) was 
required to buy sugar through the national intervention boards and it was set at 
631.9 euros/mt40.  
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Each member state set up an intervention board, which was required to 
purchase any quota sugar at the intervention price throughout the entire trade 
year, whether produced from sugar beet or sugar cane, which was grown within 
the EU41. Previously, the seller and the intervention board had to enter into a 
storage contract. After purchase, the board had to sell the sugar at a price 
superior to the intervention price, except when earmarked for animal feed or 
export42.  
 
From the trade year 1981/82 onwards, the national intervention boards 
carried out very few buy/sell operations because the sugar refineries opted to 
export their surpluses to non-EU countries43. In recent years, however, the 
boards’ interventions have grown in importance because of high surplus levels 
and limitations on subsidised exports. As a result, in August 2005, the 
intervention boards of Belgium, France and Sweden together put on the market 
247,378 mt of product purchased by them before 31 March 200544. In October 
2005, the intervention boards of Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy and Poland 
sold a total of 248,192 mt on the internal EU market, which they had purchased 
between 1 April and 30 June 200545. Recently, in January and May 2006, 
bidding was opened for the internal EU resale of sugar held by the intervention 
boards of Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Hungry, Poland, 
Slovakia, Spain and Sweden46. In the January bidding, sales of intervention 
sugar to the internal EU market amounted to 1,009,124 mt and, in May, the total 
sales volume of board-held sugar reached 1,493,137 mt.   
 
The intervention price for raw cane sugar was calculated based on the 
intervention price for white sugar, taking into account certain transport and 
refining costs. This price then served as a reference price for preferential 
imports from sugar-producing nations principally in Africa, the Caribbean and 
 13 
the Pacific (ACP). During the period in question, it was set at 523.7 euros/mt 
for raw sugar47.  
 
Lastly, institutional prices were determined for sugar beet. Taking a given 
delivery period and fair average quality, the base price was set at 47.67 euros/mt 
of sugar beet48. Processors then had to pay sugar beet growers a minimum price 
reached by subtracting from the base price the portion affected by the 
production levy rates49. The minimum price for sugar beet transformed into A 
quota sugar was equal to the base price reduced by 2% of the intervention price 
for white sugar. The minimum price for sugar beet turned into B quota sugar 
was, in principle, the base price reduced by 32% of the intervention price for 
white sugar. Where necessary, however, cuts of as much as 37.5% were 
possible. The reigning minimum price of A sugar beet in the EU was 46.72 
euros/mt of sugar beet, while the one for B sugar beet was 32.42 euros/mt50. 
 
A summary of the linkage between the intervention price for white sugar 
and the minimum price for sugar beet is set out in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Relationship between the Intervention Price for 
White Sugar and the Minimum Price of Sugar Beet 
 
INTERVENTION PRICE FOR WHITE SUGAR  
(expressed in euros/mt of white sugar) 
631.9 
(-) Transport costs of delivering sugar beet to 
refineries 
44.1 
(-) Refining costs 243.6 
(+) Income from sales of treacle (a sugar-refining 
by-product) 
22.5 
BASE PRICE OF SUGAR BEET 
(expressed in euros/mt of white-sugar equivalent) 
 
366.7 
BASE PRICE OF SUGAR BEET 
(expressed in euros/mt of sugar beet. One metric 
tonne of standard-quality sugar beet yields 130 kg 
of white sugar) 
 
 
47.67 
MINIMUM PRICE OF SUGAR BEET 
CONVERTED INTO A SUGAR  
(expressed in euros/mt of sugar beet) 
 
46.72 
MINIMUM PRICE OF SUGAR BEET 
CONVERTED INTO B SUGAR 
(expressed in euros/mt of sugar beet) 
 
32.42 
 
III.C- Trade Flows with Non-EU Countries 
 
The EU’s import/export arrangements for sugar grew out of internal 
surpluses and the sizeable gap between internal and external prices. 
  
All EU sugar imports and exports were formally required to present a certificate 
which made it possible to carry out constant monitoring of EU trade exchanges 
with non-EU countries. The certificate was provided to any company that 
requested it, regardless of the company’s place of establishment within the 
Community, because the document was valid throughout the entire EU. In any 
case, its issuance was contingent on setting up a surety bond as a guarantee of 
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operation throughout the period of the certificate’s validity. Except in cases of 
force majeure, the bond could be lost fully or in part, if the operation were not 
carried out or it were only carried out in part51. 
 
Sugar import duties fell under the regime of common customs tariffs52. 
One outcome of the GATT Agriculture Agreement of 1995 was to replace 
variable import levies and other import measures with a specific tariff 
(euros/mt). In addition, the EC was required to step down the new tariff by 
20%53 over the six years that it was in force (1995-2001). To do so, the initial 
value of the applicable tariff (524 euros/mt for white sugar) was calculated as 
the difference between average European and world sugar prices between 1986 
and 1988. Table 4 shows all of these changes. 
 
 
Table 4: Tariff Reduction Commitments on Raw and White Sugar 
Imports Reached in the Uruguay Round of GATT. 
 
 Base 
period 
(1986
-88) 
 
 
1995/
96 
 
 
199
6/97 
 
 
199
7/98 
 
 
199
8/99 
 
 
199
9/00 
 
 
200
0/01 
Variati
on 
2000/01 
– base 
period 
Variati
on 
2000/0
1- 
1995/9
6 
White 
sugar 
(euros/
mt) 524 507 490 473 456 439 419 
 
 
-20% 
 
 
-17% 
 
Raw 
sugar 
(euros/
mt) 424 410 396 382 368 354 339 
 
 
-20% 
 
 
-17% 
 
Source: WTO, List of EU commitments on tariff reduction. 
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An additional customs duty on sugar was allowed, however, in order to 
counteract the negative effects that imports might generate. To do so, it was 
necessary to meet the conditions required under the special safeguard provisions 
in Article 5 of the Agriculture Agreement. According to the provisions, an 
additional duty can be introduced when the world price is lower than 90% of the 
triggering price declared to the WTO by the EU. The trigger price for white 
sugar was specified at 531 euros/mt, and the trigger price for raw sugar was set 
at 418 euros/mt, which was its average price for the base period 1986-88.  
 
The special safeguard provisions were applied constantly during 1995/96, 
because of the relatively low world market price. In recent trade years, total 
protection—taken as both the fixed tariff and the additional duty—has been in 
the neighbourhood of 500 euros/mt of white sugar54. As a result, the extent of 
tariff protection remained practically unchanged with respect to the base period 
(see Table 4 again) and non-preferential imports of sugar were insignificant. 
 
In reality, the vast majority of European sugar imports received 
preferential terms, based on import quotas. The quota concerning raw sugar was 
fixed on the basis of the “maximum supply needs” (MSN) of European 
refineries55, amounting to 1,776,766 mt56 for each year57. In keeping with the 
schedule established in Council Regulation No 1101/95, refiners were to take on 
supplies of sugar cane as follows: from the French overseas departments, 
roughly 200,000 mt; from sugar-exporting ACP countries58, approximately 
1,300,000 mt, under the conditions of Protocol No 359; and from India, 10,000 
mt60, under the EU-India agreement61,).  In addition, the refineries would 
receive supplies of “CXL concession”62 sugar (85,463 mt) whose countries of 
origin were, principally, Cuba (58,969 mt) and Brazil (23,930 mt), and sugar 
from less developed countries under the trade agreement known as “Everything 
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But Arms”63 (approximately 100,000 mt). Lastly, the Special Preferential Sugar 
Agreement64 provided for a further volume of sugar from ACP nations (to cover 
MSNs). 
 
As for white sugar, the EU took preferential imports from the Balkan 
states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM). These imports were part of 
or tied to the EU process of stabilisation and association. They were based on 
the exceptional trade measures (elimination of quantitative limits and exemption 
of customs duties) in Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/200065. This explains 
the fact that European imports of white sugar from the Balkan states went from 
being negligible to over 300,000 mt in the trade year 2002/0366.  
 
Known as the “Balkans Initiative”, the trade agreement was very 
attractive for the above countries because of the large price gap between the two 
markets. As a result, the various national authorities supported the development 
of sugar production, especially in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. At the same 
time, EU sugar exports to the Balkans rose sharply, creating a sugar “carousel” 
driven by export subsidies between the two sets of nations. 
 
Finally, an overall quota free of customs duties was set for EU sugar 
imports from the Balkans for the trade year 2005/06. The quota amounted to 
193,000 mt: Albania, 1,000 mt; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12,000 mt; and 
Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, 180,000 mt67. Along the same lines, the 
European Commission created an annual tariff-free quota of 7,000 mt for sugar 
from the FYRM68. 
 
Regarding exports, surpluses of quota sugar produced in the European 
market were subsidised for export to external markets. The portion of A and B 
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quota production not consumed within the EU’s internal market received export 
subsidies, as did a quantity equivalent to the preferential sugar imports from the 
ACP nations and India69. The subsidy was to compensate for the gap between 
world market prices and internal market prices. 
 
The subsidy was uniform across the EU. It could, however be varied 
depending on the destination, when deemed necessary because of the state of 
world markets or specific features of a given market70. The subsidy was granted 
both for unprocessed (white or raw) sugar and for the sugar contained in certain 
transformed products71. The EU’s export subsidy for raw sugar was not to 
exceed the subsidy granted to white sugar exports72.  
 
The export subsidy commitments made in the GATT Agriculture 
Agreement called for the sugar export subsidies to be stepped down by 21% in 
volume and 36% in value over six years, taking the annual average between 
1986 and 1990 as the period of reference. Table 5 sets out the detail. Thus, 
starting with the trade year 2000/01, the maximum amount of sugar that would 
be subsidised was 1,273,500 mt at a value of 499.1 million euros. The limits had 
an effect both on unprocessed sugar exports (Chapter 17 of Annex 1 of the 
European Community Treaty (ECT)) and on the exports of transformed fruit, 
pulses and vegetables containing sugar (Chapter 20 of Annex I of the ECT)73. 
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Table 5: Commitments to Reduce Subsidised Sugar Exports Agreed 
in the Uruguay Round of GATT. 
 
 Base 
perio
d 
(1986
-90) 
 
 
199
5/96 
 
 
199
6/97 
 
 
199
7/98 
 
 
199
8/99 
 
 
199
9/00 
 
 
200
0/01 
Variati
on 
2000/0
1 – 
base 
period 
Variati
on 
2000/0
1- 
1995/9
6 
Maximu
m 
Volume 
(thousan
ds of 
mt) 
1,612.
0 
1,55
5.6 
1,49
9.2 
1,44
2.7 
1,38
6.3 
1,32
9.9 
1,27
3.5 
 
 
-21% 
 
 
-18% 
Maximu
m Value 
(million
s of 
euros) 779,9 
733.
1 
686.
6 
639.
5 
592.
7 
549.
5 
499.
1 
 
 
-36% 
 
 
-32% 
 
Course: WTO, Notifications G/AG/N/EEC/51, G/AG/N/EEC/11, 
G/AG/N/EEC/20/Rev.1, G/AG/N/EEC/23, G/AG/N/EEC/32 y 
G/AG/N/EEC/36. 
 
 
 
Surprisingly, the commitment to reduce subsidies had no effect on 
European exports of sugar that had been previously imported from ACP 
countries and India. The EU excluded ACP and Indian sugar from its 
commitments to cut subsidies, because EU trade relations with ACP nations and 
India in the case of sugar were seen as a European instrument to support their 
ongoing development. Thus, the calculation of export subsidies in the reduction 
agreement excluded sugar from India as well as total ACP sugar, based on the 
Protocol and the Special Sugar Preferential Agreement. Details of the reduction 
agreement are set out in Table 5. 
 20 
 
The calculation of export subsidies took the representative intervention 
price across the Community as its base. From this figure, the world market price 
for sugar was subtracted and transport costs required to sell sugar on the world 
market were added74. The cost of export subsidies for sugar produced within the 
EU was met by sugar processors, sugar beet growers and, to a lesser extent, 
sugar cane growers. The EU budget, however, financed the cost of export 
subsidies on ACP/Indian equivalent sugar. 
 
The sugar export subsidy mechanism within the EU rested on the 
principle of self-financing or budget neutrality, meaning that the subsidies in 
question had to be funded directly by production levies paid by the industry and 
growers. The base levy on all production of A and B sugar could not exceed 2% 
of the intervention price for white sugar75. At the same time, an additional levy 
could be imposed on B sugar production only, at a rate of as much as 37.5% of 
the white sugar intervention price. The applicable rate depended on the total 
cost of export subsidies76. Collectively, all production levies were met by sugar 
manufacturers, but sugar beet and sugar cane growers bore a portion of the cost 
through the discounted base price of sugar beet. In practice, 42% of the levies 
fell on manufacturers and 58% on growers77. 
 
Sugar refined within the EC that had originally come from ACP nations 
or India was not subject to any self-financing mechanism. As a result, export 
subsidies on white sugar from these nations were funded by the Community 
budget through the EAGGF-G, at a cost of roughly 800 million euros a year78.  
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IV. The new CMO for sugar 
 
In 2003, the European Commission prepared a working paper79 and 
presented a report80 to the Council and the European Parliament. In these 
documents, it set out options for the possible overhaul of the CMO for sugar. 
Subsequently, on 14 July 2004, the Commission announced its plan for reform 
of the sugar regime81, which centred on domestic price cuts and lower 
production quotas.  
 
There was, however, an outcry from groups within the EU. While 
awaiting the WTO’s final ruling on European export subsidies82, the EU’s 
Council of Agriculture Ministers announced on 22 November 2004 that the 
reform would not go into force during the trade year 2005/06 and that the 
European Commission would put forward a new proposal. The trade dispute 
was settled in April 2005 and the Commission proposed a new reform of the 
CMO for sugar83 on 22 June 2005, which was passed by the Council on 24 
November 200584. After the European Parliament ruling was issued on 19 
January 2006, the Council proceeded to final approval of the Regulations 
reforming the sugar sector on 20 February 200685. 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 establishes the new CMO for sugar for 
the years 2006/07 to 2009/10. However, it also determines the new system of 
quotas, prices and market management to be applied through the end of the year 
2014/15.  The next section analyses the main ways that the new regulatory 
scheme changes the intervention and protection instruments of the CMO for 
sugar.   
 
IV.A- Quota System 
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Most of the new member states of the EU-25 also produce white sugar 
from sugar beet. Only Cyprus, Estonia and Malta are not sugar producers, but 
they are supplied mainly by other EU members.  
 
The quota system is not substantially affected by the new regulations. 
Member states still receive an initial quota allocation, which has not been cut.  
They then distribute the allocation among the sugar industry in their own 
territories. The system maintains its flexibility through the quota transfer and 
carry-over mechanisms86. The main change runs deeper: the classification of A 
and B quotas and C sugar is replaced by a system based on “quota sugar”, 
“industrial sugar” and “surplus sugar”. 
 
“Quota sugar” takes in all the guaranteed quantities of sugar. In principle, 
this is the sum total of, firstly, quotas A and B as established in the Regulation 
of 2001 by the EU-15 nations and, secondly, the quotas allocated to new EU 
member states after the fifth enlargement, as stipulated in the respective acts of 
accession87. The total is 17,440,537 mt of sugar, but it can be topped up with an 
additional maximum quota of 1,100,000 mt among sugar-producing member 
states in the year 2005/088, so as to ease the transition from the previous quota 
system to the current one. In addition, the year 2006/07 was 15 months long89, 
so there was a one-off increase in the quotas for Italy (121,187 mt), Portugal 
(52,593 mt) and Spain (324,000 mt) in the period90. As shown in Table 6, 
France, Germany and Poland are the nations with the highest allocations 
(collectively, 52% of the total), followed by Italy and the United Kingdom (8% 
and 7%, respectively). 
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Table 6: Distribution of Sugar Quotas Among EU-25 
Member States as Established in the Regulation for the 
Trade Years 2006/07 - 2009/10.  
(In metric tonnes of white sugar) 
 
Countries Sugar Additional Quota 
AUSTRIA 387,326 18,486 
BELGIUM(1) 819,812 62,489 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 454,862 20,070 
DENMARK 420,746 31,720 
FINLAND 146,087 10,000 
FRANCE(2) 3,768,992 351,695 
GERMANY 3,416,896 238,560 
GREECE 317,502 10,000 
HUNGARY 401,684 10,000 
IRELAND 199,260 10,000 
ITALY 1,557,443 10,000 
LATVIA 66,505 10,000 
LITHUANIA 103,010 8,985 
THE 
NETHERLANDS 864,560 66,875 
POLAND 1,671,926 100,551 
PORTUGAL(3) 79,671 10,000 
SLOVAKIA 207,432 10,000 
SLOVENIA 52,973 10,000 
SPAIN 996,961 10,000 
SWEDEN 368,262 17,722 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 1,138,627 82,847 
TOTAL 17,440,537 1,100,000 
 
(1)
 Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. 
(2) Includes 480,245 mt of sugar produced in the French overseas 
departments. 
(3)
 Includes 9,953 mt of sugar produced in the Azores. 
 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 (Annexes III and 
IV). 
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“Industrial sugar” is the non-quota sugar that is destined for industry. In 
order to broaden the commercial uses of sugar in the EU’s internal market, 
member states can produce a surplus destined to the manufacture of products 
such as bioethanol, alcohol, rum and live yeast; certain sugarless industrial 
products that use sugar in their manufacture; and certain products of the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries that contain sugar91. As in the case of 
the previous regulations, a production subsidy can be granted for most of these 
transformed products, taking into account the costs that the industry bears when 
purchasing sugar at the EU price instead of on the world market 92.  
 
Lastly, in addition to “quota sugar” and “industrial sugar”, countries are 
allowed a volume of sugar known as “surplus sugar”93.  Surplus sugar can be 
carried over to the next trade year as quota sugar, put on account against the 
following year’s production. It can also go to the ultra-peripheral regions94 for 
human consumption or the manufacture of other products, under an exemption 
scheme on import duties, but the amount is limited by a supply forecast plan. 
Thirdly, surplus sugar can be exported within the limits set by the EU purchase 
commitments in the WTO95. The remaining surplus sugar must attract a charge 
fixed by the Commission in order to discourage non-quota stockpiles96. 
 
As a consequence, sugar processors now have a single guaranteed quota 
for sugar, which is subject to a charge of 12 euros/mt. Processors are 
responsible for payment of the charge, but they are entitled to pass on as much 
as 50% of it to sugar beet and sugar cane growers97. In addition, they can 
request an additional quota from the member state where they are located in 
return for paying the higher charge of 730 euros/mt for additional quota sugar98. 
Both quantities of sugar come under the heading “quota sugar”. Processors can 
also produce non-quota sugar. If it is for industrial use (“industrial sugar”), then 
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no charge is payable. On the other hand, if it is “surplus sugar” that is not to be 
used in any of the ways mentioned above, then it attracts a charge of 500 
euros/mt99.   
 
IV.B- Price Regime  
 
The Council of Ministers continue to set a number of institutional prices 
annually within the context of the CMO for sugar. However, the transition from 
a system based on indirect support to one built on direct support is already to 
hand. The price regime set under the Regulation of 2006 is less generous than 
the Regulation of 2001, cutting the degree of government intervention in the 
sugar market. Moreover, the Regulation of 2006 introduces compensation 
measures: a restructuring fund for sugar manufacturers and a scheme of direct 
income supports for growers. 
   
The intervention prices for both white sugar and raw cane sugar are 
withdrawn and institutional prices known as “market reference prices” are 
established. This is not merely a name change. The reference prices are lower 
than the intervention prices and reflect a less generous intervention scheme.   
 
The price regime for the trade years 2006/07-2009/10 is set out in Table 
7. The reference prices for white sugar and raw cane sugar reflect a 36% cut in 
their previous respective intervention prices. As shown in the table, the current 
price of white sugar is to cut progressively during the final two years100.  In the 
case of raw cane sugar, the price is to be stepped down throughout the four 
years101. Lastly, the minimum price for sugar beet continues to be set based on 
the reference price for white sugar, and sugar processors must guarantee this 
price to sugar beet growers whether their produce is destined to become quota 
sugar, industrial sugar or surplus sugar102.   
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Under the intervention scheme, if the market price should fall below the 
reference price in any given trade year, the intervention boards will continue to 
operate the buy/sell system in order to help stabilise the market. Intervention, 
however, is now subject to new limits. Thus, the national boards can purchase 
up to 600,000 mt of quota sugar a year across the entire EU103, and this quantity 
is subject to a storage contract between the national board and seller in question, 
set at 80% of the reference price for the following year104. The intervention 
board must subsequently sell the sugar at a price that is above the reference 
price for the year in which the sale takes place.  An exception is still made to 
permit sales at a price equal to or below the reference price if the sugar is 
destined for animal feed or the export market105.  In June 2006, i.e. at the outset 
of the trade year 2006/07, the intervention boards of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
and Sweden sold 1,370,637 mt of sugar on the internal EU market which had 
been bought by them before 10 February 2006106.    
 
As well as setting limits on intervention quantity and price, the 
Regulation of 2006 establishes new mechanisms to withdraw production from 
the market. The mechanisms apply to both sugar processors and the European 
Commission. Thus, if the market price lies below the reference price, processors 
of quota sugar can withdraw production from the market using a private storage 
scheme. Such storage receives a support set by the Commission in order to 
offset a portion of the costs107. The Commission, for its part, can withdraw 
quota sugar from the market for the length of time needed to rebalance the 
market at a price level nearer the reference price.  The withdrawal must apply to 
an equal percentage of quota sugar for all member states and it must remain in 
effect until the beginning of the following trade year108. In this case, the storage 
costs of withdrawn sugar falls to the companies allocated a quota. Once 
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withdrawn, the quantities must be reintroduced into the market as quota sugar in 
the following year, although they may come to be treated as surplus sugar 
because of the market’s development109.  
 
To adapt to the current state of the market, a temporary withdrawal 
measure was agreed for quota sugar for the trade year 2006/07110. The European 
Commission set a threshold for how much of each company’s production of 
quota sugar is considered withdrawn111.  Based on this amount, the Council of 
Agriculture Ministers passed a Commission proposal in March 2006 aimed at 
withdrawing production in the region of 2.5 million mt (13.5% of all quota 
sugar) for the year 2006/07. The approved measure distributed the volume of 
sugar to be withdrawn among member states, especially the ones that produce 
more sugar for export. The amount included the possible voluntary renunciation 
of quota by companies through the restructuring fund112. 
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Table 7: Price Regime and Restructuring Fund Established for the Years 
2006/07 - 2009/10. 
(In euros/mt) 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
REFERENCE PRICE FOR WHITE 
SUGAR 631.9 631.9 541.5 404.4 
Cumulative Reduction (%)  0 14 36 
REFERENCE PRICE FOR RAW SUGAR 496.8 496.8 448.8 335.2 
Cumulative Reduction (%)  0 10 33 
MINIMUM PRICE FOR SUGAR BEET 32.86 29.78 27.83 26.29 
 
 
   
RESTRUCTURING COSTS 126.4 173.8 113.3 - 
REFERENCE PRICE, NET OF 
RESTRUCTURING COSTS 505.5 458.1 428.2 404.4 
Cumulative Reduction (%) 20 28 32 36 
  
   
RESTRUCTURING AID(1) 730 730 625 520 
     
BALANCE FOR RESTRUCTURING 
FUND BUDGET     
Restructuring Costs 2,196 2,125 1,391 0 
Restructuring Aid 1,144 4,501 3 0 
 
(1) If a company renounces the entire quota allocated to one or more of its 
factories and then dismantles the affected productive facilities.  
 
Source: Council Regulations (EC) No 318/2006 and 320/2006. Council, 
Clarification from the Commission on the Financial Consequences of Reforming 
the CMO in Sugar, 7978/06, AGRIFIN 29, FIN 114, AGRIORG 34, 2006. 
 
 
Table 7 also shows that the cut in indirect supports is accompanied by a 
restructuring fund lasting four years in duration. The aims of the fund are to 
provide an incentive to less competitive producers to leave the industry, to 
address the social and environmental effects of factory closure, and to get 
money to the most affected regions. Support on a declining basis will be given 
to sugar manufacturers for each metric tonne of quota sugar that they renounce 
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during the period 2006/07 to 2009/10113.  The support is to be funded through a 
levy on each metric tonne of quota sugar produced by processors holding quotas 
during the period 2006/07 to 2008/09114.  A reserve of about 10% of the 
restructuring aid is to compensate growers of sugar beet and sugar cane who are 
affected by the industry’s renunciation of quota sugar115. Member states may 
allocate a portion of the restructuring money to diversification measures in 
regions affected by the restructuring of the sugar industry116. Based on the 
results of the restructuring fund, the European Commission will decide the 
percentages by which sugar quotas will be cut for member states so that there 
are no disequilibriums in the market from the year 2010/11117.  
 
In addition, because the drop in institutional prices brings with it a 
significant income cut to growers of sugar beet and sugar cane, a system is 
being set up involving direct, non-production payments. The system of direct 
income support involves an annual average expenditure of 1.4 billion euros for 
the EU budget (EAGGF-G) throughout the period 2007-13. It compensates for 
60% of each grower’s estimated losses, caused by the cut in institutional prices 
in the years 2006/07 and 2007/08, and for 64.2% of such losses from 2008/09 
onwards. Within the budgetary limits of the CAP, the calculation of supports is 
based on the same reference period used in the CAP reform of 2003 (2000-
02)118. Table 8 shows the financial report for overhauling the CMO for sugar, 
based on the forecasts for 2007-2013. 
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Table 8: Expenditure and Income from the New CMO for Sugar. 
(In million €’s) 
 
EXPENDITURE 
Status 
quo 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Domestic Support 0  904 1,215 1,473 1,605 1,581 1,581 1,497
Export Subsidies 1,253  396 30 0 0 0 0 0
Production Subsidies to the 
Chemical Industry 223  22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Aid to Refineries 41  0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POSEI 18  42 49 56 60 60 60 60
Storage Assistance 0  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL 1,535  1,364 1,294 1,529 1,665 1,641 1,641 1,557
 
INCOME          
Production Charge 0  0 115 115 115 115 115 115
Additional Quota 0  659 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Surplus 0  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Production Levy 498  0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 498  659 115 115 115 115 115 115
N/A: not available 
 
Source: Council, op. cit., 2006. 
 
  
IV.C- Trade Flows with Non-EU Countries  
 
The EU’s system of trade flows with non-EU countries is not undergoing 
great changes. It includes import duties (common customs tariffs and additional 
customs duties), tariff quotas based on preferential agreements, and export 
subsidies. The expectation is, however, that the reforms introduced in the 
CMO’s price regime will make cuts possible in both sugar surpluses and the 
price gap with world market levels. That would limit the need for export 
subsidies and enable the EU to meet commitments that may be reached in the 
current Doha Round. 
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The greatest change embodied in the new regulations concerns the 
preferential imports of sugar. In the first place, raw cane sugar imports needed 
to satisfy the “traditional supply needs” 119 of European refiners are rising to 
1,796,351 mt because of the new supply received by the refinery in Slovenia 
(19,585 mt)120. The forecast is for these supply needs to go up by 50,000 mt in 
2007/08 and by 100,000 mt from 2008/09 onwards. In addition, Portugal’s 
refiners will be able to boost supply by 30,000 mt starting in 2006/07 and by 
35,000 mt in the year in which the sugar quota is cut by at least 50%121.  
 
Tariff quotas to meet EU refineries’ supply needs remain the same, but 
the quota for “CXL concession” sugar rises to 126,671 mt for the trade year 
2006/07 and 96,801 mt for subsequent years122. Additional raw cane sugar123 
can be imported in the amounts of 70,000 mt from the ACP beneficiaries of 
Protocol No 3 and 12,500 mt from India in the year 2006/07. This is based on 
an annual EU balance sheet exercise of raw sugar supply needs124. The 
additional sugar replaces the volume imported under the Special Preferential 
Sugar Agreement, which expired at the end of 2005/06. 
 
As far as preferential imports of sugar are concerned, the quota of 
200,000 mt for sugar from the Balkans remains, which started in the trade year 
2005/06. For the year 2006/07, a one-off rise of 246,500 occurred (Albania, 
1,250 mt; Bosnia and Herzegovina,15,000 mt; Serbia and Montenegro, 225,000 
mt; and FYRM, 5,250 mt)125. A quota was also set for Croatia. On 14 March 
2006, the European Commission concluded negotiations with Croatia with a 
view to establishing a reciprocal sugar tariff quota that was to take effect on 1 
January 2007. Under the agreement, the EU is to import a tariff-free quota of 
180,000 mt of sugar from Croatia and, in return, receive a concession that grants 
preferential access at a reduced tariff to the Croatian market for a volume of 
80,000 mt of sugar126.  
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In the case of export subsidies, compensation can be given for the gap 
between the world price and the EU price insofar as it is deemed necessary—
while abiding by WTO commitments127—to enable exports to non-EU countries 
of sugar that has not undergone further transformation nor is an ingredient in 
transformed products. Thus, while awaiting the commitments to be reached in 
the Doha Round, exports of both quota sugar and surplus sugar not consumed 
within the UE but bound for non-EU countries can be supported with export 
subsidies128. Doing so must respect the obligations already assumed by the EU 
in the Uruguay Round and in the WTO’s settlement of the dispute concerning 
the EU’s system of sugar export subsidies. That means that subsidies on re-
exporting ACP sugar must fully comply with the international commitment to 
reductions. It also means that exports of C sugar remain under ban129. 
 
In any case, as Table 8 shows, the financial figures for the overhaul of the 
CMO for sugar, in the context of the Financial Outlook for 2007-2013, only 
reflects forecasted spending on export subsidies for the years 2007 (396 million 
euros) and 2008 (30 million euros). There is no expectation of a need for export 
subsidies from 2009 onwards. The previous production levies on A and B sugar 
to meet the cost of subsidies would thus be eliminated. 
 
 
V. The CMO for sugar and international demands for liberalisation 
 
The overhaul of the CMO for sugar in 2006 focused largely on the price 
regime. In keeping with other CMO reforms introduced since 1992 as part of 
the CAP, the system is beginning to shift from indirect aid to direct aid.  Thus, 
the fall in institutional prices is accompanied by a new restructuring fund aimed 
at companies that have to renounce all or part of their quota, as well as a system 
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of direct income supports for growers. The question is whether these reforms do 
enough to address the EU’s current and potential commitments on the 
international stage. 
 
There is no doubt that the CMO for sugar was not ready before the reform 
of 2006 to respond to new calls for liberalisation in any of the three pillars:  
domestic support, export subsidies and market access. The pre-2006 CMO 
regulated how the European sugar market had functioned since 1968 and it had 
only undergone partial reform in 1999 in order to adapt to the Agriculture 
Agreement agreed in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks. 
 
In the area of domestic support, the pre-2006 CMO provided for 
automatic intervention or guaranteed prices.  The national intervention boards 
would guarantee minimum prices for set quotas of sugar and would not limit the 
production of non-quota sugar. To safeguard the economic interests of all 
European growers and processors in the sugar sector, the European Community 
set high institutional prices because of the large gap in competitiveness among 
agricultural operators. That explains why domestic aid to the sugar sector, in the 
form of price supports, amounted to 15% of total MSN-related aid for the EU-
15 (5,732.1 million euros out of a total 39,281.3 million euros) for the trade year 
2001/02130. As a whole, sugar received the second-highest level of indirect aid 
behind beef. As a result, it is practically impossible to meet future commitments 
to lower MSN without cutting the indirect aid granted to the sugar sector.  
 
The regime of high prices was a production incentive, first giving rise to 
surpluses in the eighties. As shown in Table 9, the sugar supply in the European 
market, which included all A, B and C sugar produced by the European sugar 
industry and refinery imports of, largely, raw cane sugar, was far in excess of 
internal consumption levels through the period 2000/01 to 2004/05. The EU 
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generated yearly production surpluses of around 6 million metric tonnes, which 
were exported on the international market, mostly with the support of subsidies. 
This was the largest outlet for surpluses, given that annual subsidised sugar 
exports exceeded the limit adopted in the Uruguay Round. It was out of the 
question, therefore, that the previous CMO would be able to meet the 
international commitment to phasing out export subsidies if, in fact, the chapter 
stipulating this commitment in the Uruguay Round was already being violated. 
 
Table 9: Balance Sheet for the European Sugar Market 2000-2005. 
(In thousands of metric tonnes) 
                                                      EU-15  EU-25 
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05  
 
1. Production 
  Quotas for A and B Sugar 
  C Sugar 
2. Imports 
 
Supply (1 +2) 
 
3. Consumption 
4. Exports 
  Quotas for A and B Sugar 
+ 
  Refined Sugar 
  C Sugar 
 
Limit on Subsidised 
Exports  
Adopted in the Uruguay 
Round 
 
Demand (3+4) 
 
 
17,015 
13,240 
 3,775 
 2,409 
 
19,424 
 
12,900 
 6,720 
 
 2,945 
 3,775 
 
1,273.5 
 
 
19,620 
 
14,893 
13,573 
 1,320 
 2,611 
 
17,504 
 
12,942 
 4,639 
 
 3,319 
 1,320 
 
1,273.5 
 
 
17,581 
 
16,676 
13,407 
 3,269 
 2,502 
 
19,178 
 
12,914 
 6,213 
 
 2,945 
 3,268 
 
1,273.5 
 
 
19,127 
 
15,501 
13,421 
 2,080 
 2,523 
 
18,024 
 
12,992 
 5,187 
 
 3,107 
 2,080 
 
1,273.5 
 
 
18,179 
 
19,828 
16,762 
 3,066 
 2,785 
 
22,613 
 
15,237 
 5,932 
 
 2,865 
 3,067 
 
1,273.5 
 
 
21,169 
 
Note: The numerical discrepancy between supply and demand is statistical in 
nature. 
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development. 
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Unsurprisingly, the EU ceased to be one of the principal sugar-importing 
economies in the mid-sixties and instead became the second-largest sugar 
exporter in the world (behind Brazil) at the beginning of the eighties. It is also 
unsurprising that the EU has been attacked on numerous occasions for dumping 
sugar on non-EU markets. As a consequence, it can be argued that EU sugar 
policy has helped to depress world prices and, therefore, distort the world 
market.  
 
As far as market access is concerned, the EU sugar market has, for all 
intents and purposes, been closed to sugar imports from non-EU countries, with 
the exception of preferential imports based on tariff quotas, which have 
basically been aimed at satisfying the raw sugar supply needs of European 
refineries. Given the excess supply of sugar within the EU, preferential imports 
have been severely limited. They have also been affected by the application of a 
high tariff, stemming from the common external tariff and the special safeguard 
provisions, which have made up the difference between internal and external 
prices. As a result, the previous CMO was not able to deal with both a new cut 
in tariffs and the elimination of the special safeguard provisions, because that 
would have put internal production in jeopardy. 
 
The latest CMO for sugar now makes it possible to meet the new 
commitments undertaken within the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation. These include complying with the ruling against the EU’s system 
of sugar export subsidies and the multilateral negotiations being pursued in the 
Doha Round. The three affected pillars remain domestic support, market access 
and export subsidies. 
 
In the area of domestic support, cutting the intervention price for sugar by 
36% allows for substantial cutbacks in the amount of domestic aid given within 
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the EU. In particular, reduced aid to the sugar sector contributes to reaching a 
reduction of 44.6% in the EU’s MSN, coming out of the CAP reforms131. It 
represents a reform, therefore, that clearly makes it possible for the EU to 
comply with Doha demands in this area.  It must also be borne in mind that the 
restructuring fund and direct aid to growers are green-box supports. In other 
words, they are allowable supports that are not subject to calls for reductions.   
 
As for market access, the EU’s proposal for sugar tariffs is a 36% cut in 
prices. This would be sufficient if the EU managed to have sugar considered a 
“sensitive product”, especially taking into account that it will no longer have 
recourse to the special safeguard provisions. On 1 August 2004, when the new 
work programme of the Doha Round was approved, a tiered formula was agreed 
as necessary to go forward with tariff reduction. Under the formula, the highest 
tariffs would be the most severely cut. According to the latest available data, 
tariffs over 90% would, in principle, be subject to a cut of between 70% and 
80%132. The large gap between EU and world sugar prices makes it difficult for 
the EU to tackle the removal of sugar tariffs to such an extent133.  According to 
OECD data, the EU price will still run at more than twice the world price in the 
year 2010/2011134. As a result, the expectation is that the EU will negotiate in 
favour of listing sugar as a “sensitive product” so that it attracts a less severe 
tariff cut135. At the same time, it is anticipated that the EU will continue 
employing tariff quotas to address its commitments to developing and 
neighbouring countries, such as the new annual import quotas granted to sugar 
from the Western Balkans.  Moreover, as explained earlier, the EU has made a 
commitment under the “Everything But Arms” Agreement to eliminate quotas 
and tariffs on sugar imported from the less developed countries from 2009 
onwards and that may constitute a threat to the stability of the internal market. 
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The reform best prepares the CMO for sugar to tackle the third area of 
international demands: export subsidies. Cutting intervention prices and 
applying new management instruments should lead to a more stable internal 
market, i.e. one that is capable of dealing with surpluses without relying on 
export subsidies to reach the external market. In fact, the financial outlook does 
not foresee the need to fund export subsidies for sugar from 2009 onwards, 
which will make it possible to comply with the WTO’s settlement of the trade 
dispute against the previous European system of export subsidies. It will also 
make it possible to face up to any commitments that may be adopted in the Doha 
Round. Along the same lines, at the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO 
held in Hong Kong in December 2005, the developed countries agreed to 
eliminate all export subsidies on agricultural products by 2013.   
 
Cutting intervention prices needs to bring about an adjustment in 
production and, therefore, falling surpluses. The purpose of the restructuring 
fund is precisely to compensate for the effects on the industry of renouncing 
quota. In Council session no 2703 on 23 January 2006, mention was made 
especially of Italy, Poland and Portugal, who would likely suffer national cuts 
of over 50% in 2006/07 with respect to the previous year. In Spain, the 
company Ebro Puleva decided to close its factory in Ciudad Real because a 
majority of growers decided not to go ahead with sugar beet planting in the year 
2006/07 and chose instead to dedicate their land to other crops136.  
 
The adjustment in production, however, will have to be dramatic to end 
surpluses. As can be seen in Table 10, EU surpluses are going to continue, even 
if no non-quota sugar (C sugar, previously) is produced and some portion of 
production is subsidised for export (keeping in mind that, under commitments 
purchased in the WTO, the re-export of ACP and Indian sugar must abide by the 
limit agreed in the Uruguay Round). 
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Table 10: Potential Post-2006 Scenario. 
(In thousands of metric tonnes) 
 
 
1. Production 
  Quota Sugar (based on regulation, excluding 
additional quota) 
  Non-quota Sugar (hypothesis) 
2. Imports (based on quotas) 
 
Supply (1 +2) 
 
3. Consumption 
4. WTO Limit on Subsidised Exports  
 
Demand (3+4) 
 
Surplus 
 
 
17,441 
17,441 
 0 
 2,391 
 
19,832 
 
15,240 
 1,417 
  
16,657 
 
 3,175 
 
 
Thus, in order to limit export volumes, the Regulation of 2006 broadens 
the array of management instruments that address the production surpluses of 
the CMO for sugar. In addition to the system for transferring quotas among 
companies, the mechanism for carrying over sugar to the following year, and 
the buy/sell operations of the national intervention boards, all of which existed 
previously, the European Commission can now withdraw sugar for a period 
deemed necessary, companies can receive aid to store sugar, and companies are 
to be penalised for production of additional quota sugar that is surplus and has 
no specific use.   
 
In short, a critique of the international dimensions of the reform of the 
sugar regime leads to the conclusion that it is more defensive than liberalising. 
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The introduced changes constitute the least necessary to address the Doha talks 
adequately. Cutting intervention prices by 36% means that “amber-box” support 
can be reduced. The cut also makes it possible to take on a certain lowering of 
tariffs in accordance with sugar’s designation as a “sensitive product”. 
Similarly, the adjustment in production and the use of new instruments to 
manage surpluses mean that export subsidies can be eliminated in the medium 
term. Nevertheless, in the medium to long term, the EU will have to face up to 
new international calls for lower domestic support, more tariff cuts and the free 
entry of sugar from the PMA countries. 
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